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The A.L.I.’s Proposed Distributive Principle 
of “Limiting Retributivism”: 
Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other 
than Pure Desert? 
Paul H. Robinson† 
Let me first note how pleased I am that the A.L.I. has 
undertaken the new Sentencing Project Report.  
Sentencing has been a central focus of national debate for 
several decades.  It is just the kind of difficult and 
contentious issue on which the A.L.I., with its expertise 
and credibility, can make a unique and important 
contribution. 
The new sentencing project raises a host of wonderful 
issues on which I could say something.  I have written a 
good deal about structuring sentencing decision making,1 
for example.  But because there are no specific proposals on 
these matters I thought I would use this space to comment 
on that aspect of project that has resulted in at least a 
sample proposed black letter text: the official statement of 
the “purposes” that are to guide decision makers in 
sentencing. 
The proposed principle for distributing criminal 
sanctions is an important step forward from the existing 
Model Penal Code section 1.02, which offers only a facade 
of guidance.  By listing a host of purposes without defining 
their interrelation, the current provision offers no real 
guidance; different purposes will suggest different 
sentences and the provision gives no guidance in selecting 
among the possibilities.  Worse, it is subject to conscious or 
subconscious abuse.  It lets a judge first settle on a result, 
 
 †  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 
Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Paul H. Robinson, Legality and Discretion in the 
Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 25 Harv. J. on Legis. 393 (1988); Paul H. 
Robinson, One Perspective on Sentencing Reform, 8 Crim. L.F. 1 (1997); Paul H. 
Robinson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Ten Years Later: An Introduction 
and Comments, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1231 (1997). 
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then work backwards to offer as its justification whichever 
of the listed purposes supports that result.  This is not 
principled decision making.2  The Report’s proposed 
provision offers a true distributive principle that tells 
decision makers with greater clarity what criteria should 
guide their judgments.3 
The Report adopts as its principle what it describes as 
“limiting retributivism,” an approach it attributes to 
Norval Morris.  I have some reservations about “limiting 
retributivism” as Morris and others have advanced it, but I 
do not have reservations about the Report’s proposed 
principle, for reasons I will explain. 
On the contrary, I very much support it.  But I do so 
because I believe that in practice the Report’s proposal will 
produce a very different distributive principle than the 
advocates of “limiting retributivism” would want. 
This leaves me with a dilemma.  To explain what I 
think is so attractive about the Report’s proposal, I must 
explain what I think the true effect of the proposal will be, 
and that explanation may serve only to undermine its 
support among the “limiting retributivism” advocates.  I 
have decided to proceed despite the risk, however, 
comforted in the fact that people are commonly 
unpersuaded by what I say. 
With regard to determining punishment, the proposed 
distributive principle might be outlined in this way: 
(i) In determining punishment, look to the extent of 
the offender’s blameworthiness (including the 
seriousness of the offense), 
(ii) but reliance upon the traditional utilitarian 
purposes of rehabilitation, general deterrence, and 
incapacitation of the dangerous, as well as “restoration of 
crime victims and communities,” is permitted where the 
purpose can effectively be achieved, 
 
 2. See Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal 
Sanctions, 82 Nw U. L. Rev. 19 (1987) [hereinafter Hybrid]. 
 3. For a remaining caveat on its success in this regard, see infra text 
accompanying note 13. 
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(iii) but such reliance may not produce punishment 
in conflict with the offender’s degree of 
blameworthiness.4 
What will be the instances under this proposal in 
which the distribution of punishment will be guided by a 
principle other than desert?  The answer, I suggest, is: not 
many.  (By “punishment according to desert” I mean 
punishment according to the offender’s personal 
blameworthiness for the past offense, which takes account 
not only of the seriousness of the offense but also the full 
range of culpability, capacity, and situational factors that 
we understand to affect an offender’s blameworthiness.5) 
I.  THE LIMITATIONS ON PERMITTED DEVIATION FROM 
DESERT DUE TO THE PROPOSAL’S EFFECTIVENESS 
REQUIREMENT 
Reliance upon non-desert purposes will be seriously 
limited, first, by the fact that those purposes commonly 
cannot effectively be achieved, and thus are excluded from 
use by paragraph (ii) of the proposed distributive principle.  
Consider each of the traditional utilitarian purposes in 
turn.  As the Report concedes, there are limits to the 
effectiveness one can expect from rehabilitation programs.6 
As is becoming apparent from social science research, 
our realistic expectations for the effectiveness of deterrence 
also are fading, as John Darley and I have detailed 
elsewhere.7  Potential offenders commonly do not know the 
 
 4. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Report 129, § 
1.02(2)(a)(i)-(ii) (April 11, 2003) [hereinafter Report].  The provision also requires 
that a sentence be no more severe than is necessary to achieve the applicable 
purpose, but I take this to be inherent in the requirement of fixing punishment 
according to an offender’s blameworthiness (and inherent in the efficient 
achievement of the utilitarian purposes). 
 5. Some writers, typically opponents of a desert distribution, offer a much 
more limited notion of desert, but all thoughtful desert advocates that I know 
essentially support the description I have offered here.  More on this issue at infra 
text accompanying notes 21-22. 
 6. American Law Institute, Report, supra note 4, at 28-31. 
 7. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?  A 
Social Science Investigation, 24 Oxford J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2004); Paul H. 
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legal rules, either directly or indirectly, even those rules 
that have been explicitly formulated to produce a deterrent 
effect.  Even if they know the rules, the cost-benefit 
analysis potential offenders perceive—which is the only 
cost-benefit analysis that matters in deterrence—commonly 
leads to a conclusion suggesting violation rather than 
compliance, either because the perceived likelihood of 
punishment is so small, or because it is so distant as to be 
highly discounted, or for a variety of other reasons.  And, 
even if they know the legal rules and perceive a cost-benefit 
analysis that urges compliance, potential offenders 
commonly cannot or will not bring such knowledge to bear 
to guide their conduct in their own best interests, due to a 
variety of social, situational, or chemical influences.  Even 
if no one of these three hurdles is fatal to law’s deterrent 
influence, their cumulative effect typically is fatal.8 
 
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of 
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 Geo. L.J. 949 (2003). 
 8. Even if the prerequisites to deterrence did exist, using deterrence as a 
distributive principle faces other serious challenges.  First, such use requires 
information that is not available, and not likely to be available any time in the 
foreseeable future, and requires a complexity of analysis that is beyond our 
current or foreseeable capacity.  Second, any distributive principle for criminal 
liability and punishment will produce some deterrent effect (if any is to be had).  
A deterrence-based distribution makes sense only if it can provide meaningfully 
greater deterrent effect than that already inherent in competing distributions 
that advance other valuable goals, such as doing justice.  Finally, even if one 
assumes for the sake of argument that a deterrence-based distribution could 
produce a greater deterrent effect than a justice-based distribution, there is 
reason to be concerned that the deterrence-based distribution also produces more 
crime because its conflicts with the community’s shared intuitions of justice and 
thereby undercuts the criminal law’s moral credibility, lessening its crime-control 
power as a moral authority, a dynamic that can have significant crimogenic effect. 
There are possibilities for reform, but also serious limitations, due in large 
part to the sacrifices such reforms would demand: in greater financial cost, in 
infringing interests of privacy and freedom from governmental intrusion, in 
compromising basic notions of procedural fairness, and in doing injustice and 
failing to do justice.  A realistic view of deterrence, even after plausible reforms 
are made, would have little increase in the deterrent effect of doctrinal 
manipulation, and not enough to justify its continued use as the standard 
mechanism of criminal-law making analysis.  See Robinson & Darley, Does 
Criminal Law Deter?  A Social Science Investigation, supra note 7; Robinson & 
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its 
Worst When Doing Its Best, supra note 7. 
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There seems little doubt that having a criminal justice 
system that punishes violators, as every organized society 
has, does have a deterrent effect; having a punishment 
system does deter.  But accumulating evidence increasingly 
suggests that there is little added deterrent effect that can 
be derived from the manipulation of criminal law rules for 
the distribution of criminal liability and punishment within 
that system. 
It is true that incapacitation undoubtedly works to 
prevent future crime.  Prison terms, for example, do 
prevent offenders from reoffending, at least against the 
unimprisoned population.  But as I have argued elsewhere,9 
while incapacitation works, it also incurs serious costs, 
including costs in effective crime prevention.  Using the 
criminal justice system for such preventive detention, 
rather than providing such detention in a more open and 
explicit fashion, both produces unnecessarily ineffective 
prevention and subverts justice.  Both society and potential 
detainees would be better off if such preventive detention 
purposes were not cloaked as criminal justice but advanced 
openly and honestly in an explicit system of preventive 
detention. 
The community would be better off because an openly 
preventive system offers both more justice and increased 
protection from dangerous offenders.  Giving the criminal 
justice system a better chance of doing justice is valuable 
for its own sake.  It also creates greater moral credibility 
for the system, and thus greater long-term crime-control 
power.10  An explicit preventive detention system also offers 
better protection, because it can directly consider a person’s 
present dangerousness and more accurately predict who is 
dangerous.  Such a system also enhances accuracy by 
allowing for periodic re-evaluations, in comparison with the 
present system’s need to make a single prediction of 
 
 9. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive 
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1429 (2001) [hereinafter 
Dangerousness]. 
 10. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 453 (1997). 
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dangerousness years in advance.  Greater accuracy leads to 
more detention of the dangerous, better protection, and less 
detention of the nondangerous, thus saving resources. 
Segregating preventive detention from criminal justice 
also benefits the potential detainees for many of the same 
reasons.  Better accuracy in prediction means less 
detention of nondangerous offenders.  Periodic re-
evaluation leads to detention limited to periods of actual 
dangerousness.  Acknowledging the preventive nature of 
the detention also logically suggests a right to treatment, a 
right to nonpunitive conditions, and the application of the 
principle of minimum restraint, meaning greater freedom 
among those who are detained.11 
The purpose of “restoration of crime victims and 
communities” presents a situation similar in some respects 
to incapacitation.  There is evidence that “restorative” 
processes, such as sentencing circles, victim-offender 
mediation, and family group conferences, do work, in the 
 
 11. See Robinson, Dangerousness, supra note 9: 
Beyond the new limitations imposed on it, an open system of 
preventive detention ought to be preferred precisely because it is open 
rather than cloaked.  No one can guarantee that a legislature or court will 
not attempt to abuse its power.  But an open system makes it harder to 
abuse the system.  The openly preventive nature of the system makes it 
susceptible to closer scrutiny, which the present cloaked system escapes.  
Instead of the current debates—which typically reduce to disagreements 
about, for example, whether “three strikes” sentences are “too long”—the 
debate would shift to the many aspects of preventive detention that cry out 
for debate: What is the reliability of the predictions of dangerousness?  Is 
the threatened danger sufficient to justify the extent of intrusion on 
personal liberty?  Are there less expensive or less intrusive measures that 
would as effectively protect the community?  Under the current cloaked 
system, these issues escape examination and debate. 
Imagine a legislature considering an explicit preventive detention 
statute that would provide life preventive detention on a third conviction 
for a minor fraud offense . . . .  Such legislation would be difficult to defend 
and would be unlikely to find support in any political quarter.  Indeed, 
imagine the Supreme Court’s review of Rummel if Rummel were being 
preventively detained.  Life terms without the possibility of parole may be 
common and acceptable in a criminal justice system, in which horrible 
crimes deserve severe punishment.  But life commitment with no further 
dangerousness review for a property offense would be preposterous on its 
face in a civil preventive detention system. 
Id. at 1455. 
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sense that they can help “restore” victims and communities 
and can have a modest effect in reducing crime by the same 
offenders in the future.  But depending on how they are 
used, restorative processes also can produce more future 
crime.  For example, they may produce results that 
seriously deviate from shared community intuitions of 
justice and, thus, can undercut the criminal law’s moral 
credibility and thereby its power to gain compliance as a 
moral authority that can harness social norms.12 
The incapacitation and “restoration” purposes reveal a 
weakness in the Report’s proposed distributive principle: it 
does not seem to allow one to take into account the costs of 
advancing a purpose—for example, its crime-producing 
effects—that may outweigh its benefits—such as its crime-
prevention effects.  The proposed text authorizes reliance 
upon one of the enumerated goals when it is possible “to 
serve [the] goals.”  Thus, as long as the goal is being 
satisfied—rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation, 
or “restoration of crime victims and communities”—the 
Report’s test would authorizes reliance upon it even if such 
would seriously increase future crime!  While the 
enumerated purposes have traditionally and primarily been 
justified as crime reduction mechanisms, the proposed text 
language does not actually require such. 
A second flaw in the proposed distributive principle is 
its failure to give guidance in selecting among the 
enumerated purposes when more than one of those 
purposes meets the “realistic prospect of success” test and 
the alterative purposes suggest different distributions.  If 
both incapacitation and “restoration,” for example, have a 
“realistic prospect of success” but suggest different 
sentences, as they commonly would, which purpose should 
be advanced?  The provision fails to tell us, thus essentially 
leaving it to the unbridled discretion of the sentencing 
judge, with all of the potential for abuse and disparity in 
treatment of similar cases that such discretion brings.  
 
 12. See Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of 
Restorative Justice, in Symposium on Restorative Justice, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 375; 
Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 10. 
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Recall that a similar (albeit more disabling) failure of this 
sort has been part of the criticism of current Model Penal 
Code section 1.02(2).13  For reasons I explain immediately 
below, the practical effect of these flaws in the proposed 
distributive principle may be limited. 
II.  THE LIMITATIONS ON PERMITTED DEVIATION FROM 
DESERT DUE TO DESERT’S ORDINAL RANKING DEMANDS 
Compared to this first limitation on non-desert 
distributive principles—the difficulty in showing that such 
purposes can be achieved or achieved without causing more 
crime than they avoid—the second constraint on the 
influence of the enumerated non-desert purposes is more 
important and dramatic in its effect: the “limiting 
retributivism” distributive principle will in practice be 
primarily a desert distributive principle because of the 
proposed text’s demand that no distribution of punishment 
may conflict with the demands of desert. 
Contrary to the assumption of the original advocates of 
“limiting retributivism”—that desert provides only vague 
outer limits on punishment—desert has quite specific 
demands, driven in large part by the demand of ordinal 
ranking.  Desert demands that a case of greater 
blameworthiness receive greater punishment than a case of 
comparatively less blameworthiness.14  Given the limited 
range of punishments a liberal democracy ought to be 
willing to inflict, distinguishing cases of distinguishable 
blameworthiness means that the deserved punishment in 
any given case will fall within a narrow range on the 
punishment continuum. 
This deontological conclusion (that desert requires a 
rather specific amount of punishment in order to properly 
rank it against other cases) turns out to be entirely 
consistent with recent social science research that reveals 
fairly sophisticated intuitions of justice shared by lay 
 
 13. See text accompanying supra note 3. 
 14. See Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and 
Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals ch. 4 (1985). 
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persons.15  Small changes in facts can alter the consensus 
view of the comparative blameworthiness of an offender 
and, thus, the relative punishment that lay persons see the 
offender as deserving. 
This characteristic of desert—its demand that 
distinguishable degrees of blameworthiness result in 
distinguishable amounts of punishment—means that 
desert demands specific amounts of punishment, not vague 
limitations on it, and this, in turn, has important 
implications: even where the enumerated non-desert 
purposes pass the Report proposal’s effectiveness test, the 
purposes will rarely be used because such use would 
commonly conflict with desert.16  And where they do not 
conflict—where they give the same result as a desert 
distribution—they are irrelevant.  That is, non-desert 
purposes are relevant only to the extent that they suggest a 
distribution of punishment different from desert, yet such 
deviation is expressly forbidden by the Report’s proposal! 
I don’t want to overstate the case.  There will be 
instances where a non-desert distribution will not conflict 
with desert.  For example, desert generally cares about 
punishment amount, not punishment method.17  Thus, once 
the punishment amount is determined, one could look to 
any number of non-desert purposes to determine how that 
fixed amount of punishment is to be imposed.18  One might 
 
 15. See Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame: 
Community Views and the Criminal Law (1995) [hereinafter Justice, Liability, 
and Blame]; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Objectivist vs. Subjectivist 
Views of Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal Law 
Theory, 18 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 409 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, 
Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1095 (1998). 
 16. See, e.g., Robinson, Hybrid, supra note 2, at 22-28; Dangerousness, supra 
note 9, at 1439-1443. 
 17. Not everyone would agree with this conclusion.  Dan Kahan, for example, 
would argue that there sometimes is no substitute for a sentence of imprisonment 
as a means of signaling the seriousness of the offense.  Dan M. Kahan, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1996). 
 18. See Paul H. Robinson, Desert, Crime Control, Disparity, and Units of 
Punishment, in Penal Theory and Practice: Tradition and Innovation in Criminal 
Justice 93 (Antony Duff et al. eds., 1994); Robert E. Harlow, John M. Darley & 
Paul H. Robinson, The Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A 
Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining Community Perceptions, 11 J. 
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look to the special circumstances of each case to determine 
whether the punishment method should maximize 
incapacitation or restoration, or even rehabilitation or 
general deterrence if the special circumstances exist that 
make achievement of such purposes possible.19 
Ultimately, I predict that the Report’s proposed 
distributive principle, with its prohibition of any 
distribution that conflicts with desert, will look almost 
exclusively to the desert principle in determining the 
amount of punishment to be imposed, both because many of 
the non-desert purposes cannot effectively be achieved and 
because those that can be achieved can do so only by 
deviating from desert. 
As I noted at the start, there is the danger that my 
remarks here will undercut support for the Report among 
traditional “limiting retributivism” advocates, who often 
disapprove of a pure desert distribution.  It seems likely, 
however, that they will simply ignore these remarks, 
comfortable in their conception of desert as having limited 
practical effect—as simply barring grossly disproportionate 
punishment.  Perhaps they will be prompted to make clear 
in a carefully prepared legislative history for the proposed 
text the notion of desert upon which their drafting relies.  I 
hope that move makes them feel better. 
It will not make me feel worse.  For the truth is that 
desert is not a notion that is a creature of academics or one 
that can be controlled by a prepared legislative history.  
When the text says that the distribution of punishment 
must reflect “the blameworthiness of the offender,” those 
words refer to a concept, blameworthiness, that has a strong 
and clear intuitive meaning, one shared among most lay 
persons and many criminal justice professionals, and it is 
that view of desert that will in the longer term have its say. 
 
Quantitative Criminology 71 (1995). 
 19. Of course, there remains the troublesome failure of the proposed principle 
to articulate which among the enumerated non-desert purposes is to be served 
when more than one of those purposes could be achieved but where the different 
purposes suggest different methods of punishment.  See text accompanying supra 
note 13. 
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III.  TWO KINDS OF OPPOSITION TO DESERT 
In closing, let me address the more basic issue that 
drives the debate: whether people should be concerned 
about a distributive principle that looks purely to desert in 
determining amount of punishment.  It seems unlikely that 
anything I can say here could change minds on such a 
fundamental issue, but one never knows. 
My experience suggests that there are two kinds of 
people who oppose a desert distributive principle: those 
who misunderstand it, and those who think justice less 
important than crime reduction.  A brief comment to each 
group: 
To the first group, who think desert is harsh and 
insensitive—often in the form of an eye-for-an-eye view of 
desert, in which anger and humiliation play a role20—I say 
that they should energetically oppose desert, if it really 
meant what they think it means.  But, as I have already 
suggested in my definition of “desert” at the start of these 
remarks,21 their view of desert is in error and has been in 
error for many decades.  As far as I know, every thoughtful 
modern proponent of desert envisions a system that takes 
account of every aspect of an offense and an offender that 
alters our assessment of an offender’s blameworthiness. 
Yes, it is true, people disagree about what affects 
blameworthiness.  The most dramatic example I can think 
of is that some people think that resulting harm ought to 
increase punishment while others think it ought not and 
that the focus should be only on things like one’s conduct, 
culpability, and capacities.  But that kind of disagreement 
is found in every distributive principle.  People will 
disagree about what factors ought to be taken into account 
in a system built on general deterrence or incapacitation.  
Indeed, in some respects, desert is more subject to 
definitive determination than any other distributive 
principle because one can with some precision determine at 
 
 20. See, for example, the papers for this symposium by Ed Rubin and James 
Whitman. 
 21. See supra note 5. 
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least what the members of the community governed by a 
criminal justice system think are the relevant factors,22 
while it is very difficult to get reliable data on the most 
basic factors for non-desert purposes.  (More on this in a 
moment.)  If the fear is that lack of complete agreement as 
to what constitutes desert may produce unduly harsh 
punishments, one need only look at the variety of current 
objectionable sentencing practices—such as “three 
strikes”—to see that the far more prominent producers of 
harsh punishment are the non-desert distributive 
principles, such as general deterrence and incapacitation.  
Indeed, the harshness of the current system may be 
attributed in largest part to the move to rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, and deterrence, which disconnected 
criminal punishment from the constraint of just desert. 
A word to the second group, those who object to a desert 
distribution because it condemns us to needlessly suffer 
avoidable crimes.  Their objection is not based upon an error, 
as is the case with the first group, but upon an entirely 
legitimate view that doing justice may be nice but avoiding 
crime is more important.  To this group I would argue that 
they may overestimate the crime reduction potential of non-
desert purposes, and underestimate the crime reduction 
effect naturally inherent in a desert distribution.  As I noted 
above, rehabilitation and general deterrence have limited 
crime prevention effectiveness, and incapacitation and 
“restoration” may work but may have serious crimogenic 
costs.  It is too early for us to know how the numbers will 
crunch, but I would suggest to this second group that they 
ought to at least be open to a conclusion that, when the 
numbers are crunched, a desert distribution will be seen as 
reducing crime more effectively than distributions that 
conflict with desert, and which thereby undercut the 
criminal law’s moral authority with the community.23 
The larger point here is that this is an empirical issue.  
No one can make crime reduction arguments with complete 
 
 22. On the issue of the significance of resulting harm, for example, see 
Robinson, Justice, Liability, and Blame, supra note 15, at Studies 1 & 17. 
 23. See Robinson, Utility of Desert, supra note 10. 
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authority because we simply don’t have—and are not likely 
in the near future to have—sufficient information to give a 
reliable answer as to what distribution produces the least 
crime.  My point is that, in the absence of the information 
necessary to know what kind of distribution will work best, 
doesn’t it make sense in the interim at least to do what we 
know we can do: do justice? 
